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 ABSTRACT 
In 2011, the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence stated that 1.3 million 
individuals are victims of domestic violence (DV) every year. This staggering statistic 
uncovers just how relevant the issue of domestic violence is in the United States. 
Research has been relatively silent concerning the examination of police officer response 
time to DV calls for assistance. Response time is important to all calls for service, but is 
extremely important in domestic violence calls where victims run the risk of physical 
injury.  
This study found that response time did not have a significant effect on whether 
the offender was present on-scene at the time of their arrival, whether the victim 
sustained any injuries during the altercation, or whether the victim required medical 
attention. However, it was found that response time did have a statistically significant 
effect on offender arrest. More specifically, the odds of an offender being placed under 
arrest decreased 4.7% for every minute of response time.  
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In 2011, the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence stated that 1.3 million 
individuals are victims of domestic violence (DV) every year. This staggering statistic 
uncovers just how pertinent the issue of domestic violence is in the United States. 
According to the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (2011), domestic 
violence is defined as when one willfully assaults, batters, intimidates or abuses their 
partner. Those who experience domestic violence do not come from one particular group 
as it affects individuals from all walks of life. The issue of domestic violence has 
generated a number of responses by the criminal justice system; one area in particular 
concerns police agencies. Police response to domestic violence has continually changed, 
and due to the number of individuals who fall victim, its relevance has increased. 
Responses to domestic violence include police training, domestic violence assessments, 
and expanding services available to victims of DV incidents.  
Response time is important to all calls for service, but it is extremely important to 
domestic violence calls where victims run the risk of physical injury. Research has been 
relatively limited concerning the examination of police response time to domestic 
violence calls for assistance. This study examined whether or not police response time to 
domestic violence calls for service affects a number of on-scene factors. Posing this 
question opened the opportunity for further studies to be done and the amount of research 
on the topic to expand.  
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Police response to domestic violence calls for assistance is of concern for a 
variety of reasons. First, police officers are often the first criminal justice professionals to 
come in contact with domestic violence victims and offenders. How the police respond to 
domestic violence calls and handle domestic violence situations can affect the overall 
experience of the involved parties. Second, officer response time to domestic violence 
calls can affect the ability to gather more evidence at the scene. Evidence collection in 
DV incidents is pertinent not only to the arrest decision, but the prosecutor’s decision to 
charge as well (Peterson & Bialo-Padin, 2012). Arriving promptly to DV calls for 
assistance can increase the ability to gather proper evidence at the scene. Third, there is 
the potential that a faster response time could possibly reduce the extent of injuries to the 
victim. With nearly 1,400 females killed by their male partners each year, and over one 
million women who are victims of domestic violence (National Coalition Against 
Domestic Violence, 2011), the response to domestic violence demonstrated by police 
officers should receive more attention. If the issue of domestic violence was better 
understood, as well as the possible responses that could be given to those who report it, 
perhaps domestic violence could become a less common issue. This is not to say that any 
type of response would necessarily prevent perpetrators from abusing their victims, but 
through actually addressing domestic violence, perhaps abusers would be deterred from 
continuing the abuse.  
In this next section, a summary of how police response to domestic violence has 
evolved throughout the years is presented. Additionally, the summary will provide 
information on the myths of domestic violence, the two types of action police take 
against domestic violence, the use of lethality risk assessments, and police response time 
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to non-domestic violence calls for service. This literature review will demonstrate that 
there is a significant lack of research specifically examining domestic violence and 




Response to Domestic Violence: The Road to Reform 
Research has shown domestic violence to encompass a number of different 
behaviors such as threats of violence, intimidation, verbal abuse and physical abuse 
(Koss, Goodman, Browne, Keita, & Russo, 1994; LaViolette & Barnett, 2000; Frantzen, 
& San Miguel, 2009). Traditionally, the legal system viewed domestic violence (DV) as a 
private matter (Mills, 1998; Frantzen, & San Miguel, 2009) and police were reluctant to 
get involved with DV issues because they did not view such incidents as a legal issue 
(Eigenberg, Kappeler, & McGuffee, 2012; Lee, Zhang, & Hoover, 2012). This skewed 
perception by police led to a number of legislative changes. According to multiple 
sources, four major factors influenced these legislative changes (Eigenberg et al., 2012; 
Buzawa, 2012; Leisenring, 2012).  
First, the traditional way police responded to domestic violence was shown to be 
ineffective. Police were often advised to mediate and/or separate, which worsened 
situations between the abuser and their victim. Mediating and separating opened up the 
opportunity for the abuser to return home more upset with the victim for reporting their 
actions to law enforcement officials (Eigenberg et al., 2012). Second, there was an 
increase in the number of women advocacy organizations around the nation, along with 
changes in national social values. These women advocacy groups brought about legal 
pressure regarding the possibility of police liability if the police continued to use 
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practices that ignored domestic violence victims (Buzawa, 2012; Leisenring, 2012). 
Third, lawsuits were filed against police agencies, citing them for not adequately 
enforcing DV incidents. Victims were largely ignored and abusers were rarely arrested by 
officers and, in some instances, police would threaten to arrest both parties if they were 
called back to that same house (Eigenberg et al., 2012). Fourth, in the late 1970s, many 
law enforcement officers and domestic violence advocates started to question whether 
non-punitive therapeutic responses to domestic violence were effective (Maxwell, Garner 
& Fagan, 2001). States began to enact laws and police departments developed policies 
that allowed officers to make an arrest even when they did not witness a domestic 
violence act. In 1980, the Police Foundation decided to test whether arresting abusers was 
more effective at reducing intimate partner violence than non-punitive therapeutic 
responses. The most noteworthy research addressing this question was the Minneapolis 
Domestic Violence Experiment (MDVE) and six follow-up experiments known as the 
National Institute of Justice’s Spouse Assault Replication Program (SARP; Maxwell et 
al., 2001).  
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment was conducted by Sherman and 
Berk in 1984. The main purpose behind the experiment was to address the way in which 
police officers should respond to misdemeanor domestic violence cases (Sherman & 
Berk, 1984). Moreover, the study allowed for a random determination of what response 
officers would use on the suspects involved in each domestic violence case. The three 
options included: suspect arrest, separation of the victim and offender for at least eight 
hours, or the officer providing mediation to both parties involved. Furthermore, each 
officer carried around a pad of report forms, each coded for a color that corresponded to 
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one of the three responses. Each time the officer encountered a situation that fit within the 
experiment’s criteria, they were to execute whatever response was indicated by the color 
of the form. The experiment also provided a six month follow-up period to determine 
how often and how serious any future domestic violence incidents were (Sherman & 
Berk, 1984).  
The MDVE paved the way for changing how police responded to domestic 
violence incidents. Findings from the experiment suggested that suspect arrest in DV 
incidents significantly reduced recidivism (Sherman & Berk, 1984; Mills, 1998; Maxwell 
et al., 2001; Sun, 2006; Eigenberg et al., 2012; Klein, 2012; Lee et al., 2012). Despite 
these findings, Sherman and Berk (1984) cautioned fellow researchers to take into 
account the relatively small sample size, the location of Minneapolis and its 
demographics, the fact that Minneapolis holds domestic violence offenders in jail 
overnight, and the possibility of results being skewed because of interviewer effects. 
Against the cautious conclusions provided by Sherman and Berk (1984), many domestic 
violence practitioners and legislatures embraced these findings and a shift towards 
mandatory DV arrests began.  
Soon after the Sherman and Berk (1984) Minneapolis study, the SARP 
experiments were implemented (Mills, 1998; Eigenberg et al., 2012). These follow-up 
studies were conducted throughout the United States (Nebraska, Wisconsin, North 
Carolina, Colorado, and Florida), and each produced different results (Maxwell et al., 
2001). Between Sherman and Berk’s initial 1984 study and the five replicated studies, it 
was reported in three of them that offenders who were arrested had higher levels of 
recidivism and, in the other three, there was a statistically significant yet minimal 
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decrease in recidivism among arrested offenders. Due to the inconsistencies between the 
six studies, many scholars began to question the validity of relying on arrest as the 
primary response to intimate partner violence (Maxwell et al., 2001). It was these 
inconsistencies that prompted Maxwell et al. (2001) to combine the results from the six 
studies and conduct their own meta-analysis; the researchers found several interesting 
results. First, the findings supported that arresting male abusers can significantly reduce 
future intimate partner violence. Second, the research showed that a small number of 
suspects continued to abuse their intimate partners, regardless of any intervention they 
received. Third, the results demonstrated that a majority of suspects stopped their abusive 
behavior even without being arrested (Maxwell et al., 2001). The impact of the SARP 
experiments was the expansion of research on officer response to domestic violence, and, 
a demonstration that perhaps there is no one single way to respond to domestic violence.  
Given the mixed findings on mandatory arrests, attention shifted to the victims 
and their preference in resolving the incident. Researchers began to find that the majority 
of domestic violence victims would either refuse to make statements to the police or they 
would later recant their statements (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000; White, Goldkamp & 
Campbell, 2005). It was because of this that researchers began to note the importance of 
victim empowerment. Empowering DV victims is something all police officers should 
strive towards (White et al., 2005). Moreover, if officers can respond promptly to a 
victim’s call for help, this can demonstrate to the victim that officers are responding to 
their call for help.  Additionally, victim empowerment worked to establish conditions that 
allowed women to understand what options they have that were in their interest and 
encouraged them to take advantage of these resources (White et al., 2005). In a number of 
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jurisdictions around the country, police departments blended both pro-mandatory arrest 
policies and established a relationship with victims to ensure they were connected to the 
proper resources (Buzawa, 2012). This type of approach often times involved domestic 
violence advocates, social workers, and/or victim witness coordinators working with 
police officers on domestic violence cases. This allowed police officers to focus on the 
arrest (if there was one) and build a case with the prosecutor, while the DV advocate, 
social worker, and/or victim witness coordinator provided services to the victim. These 
support services typically include counseling, emergency shelters, assistance, and legal 
aid (Kramer & Black, 1998; White et al., 2005).  
Police response to domestic violence has continued to change dramatically over 
the years, with a shift from less formal methods of response (e.g., mediation) to an 
increase in mandatory arrest laws (White, 2007).  According to Sun (2006), actions taken 
by the police when handling domestic violence incidents can be separated into two 
groups: coercive and non-coercive actions. Coercive actions are responses such as arrest, 
threatening, search and seizure, and use of deadly force. Officers use coercive force to 
show authority over those involved in that DV situation and to maintain order. Non-
coercive actions, such as counseling, mediation, providing assistance, and showing 
compassion, are more focused on providing the involved parties with emotional support 
(Sun, 2006). In order for either type of action to be effective, police need to apply the 
proper reaction to the proper circumstance. More specifically, they should be beneficial 
to both victim and perpetrator. For the purposes of this study, rapid response time can be 
seen as a non-coercive action police can take. Moreover, it allows officers to provide 
 
9 
support to involved parties by showing them that their call to them for help is important, 
without officers having to resort to using coercive actions.  
Legislative Changes to Domestic Violence 
Not only has police response changed with regards to domestic violence incidents 
with a shift from separation and mediation to pro-arrest, but questions regarding equal 
protection under the law have also helped to bring about DV reform allowing victims to 
win lawsuits against the police because of their failure to respond adequately to domestic 
violence incidents. Thurman v. City of Torrington (1984) was one of the first cases that 
involved the issue of equal protection by the police (Blackwell & Vaughn, 2003; 
Frantzen & San Miguel, 2009). In this case, the victim stated that the police failed to 
provide equal protection to women who had been abused by their intimate partners 
compared to women who were abused by someone with whom they had no prior 
domestic relationship. The police were found liable because they were unable to justify 
their different response to victims. In the 1999 case, Didzerekis v. Stewart, the U.S. 
District Court in Northern Illinois found police liable for their improper response to a 9-
1-1 call by a female victim of domestic violence (Blackwell & Vaughn, 2003). 
Additionally, previous research has indicated that police have viewed some 9-1-1 
domestic violence calls as a lower priority compared to other calls they receive (Sinden & 
Stephens, 1999; Blackwell & Vaughn, 2003; Frantzen & San Miguel, 2009). 
Furthermore, some researchers have noted that this low priority can be demonstrated if 
departments dispatch officers to a crime in progress not related to domestic violence but 
fail to send officers to in progress domestic violence 9-1-1 calls (Frantzen & San Miguel, 
2009). Overall, this lack of adequate and timely response can significantly influence the 
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response time of a domestic violence call for assistance. Additionally, a number of court 
cases have addressed the issue of domestic violence incidents being labeled low priority.   
In the case Navarro v. Block (1995), a dispatcher refused to send an officer to the 
scene of a domestic violence incident (Blackwell & Vaughn, 2003). One of the victims, 
Maria Navarro, called 9-1-1 and told the operator that she was concerned her ex-husband, 
Raymond, was going to come and kill her because of a threat she had received. The 
dispatcher told Navarro that there was nothing they could do because Raymond had not 
yet arrived at the house. Less than an hour later, Raymond showed up to Maria’s home 
and shot and killed her and four other people who were present. Relatives of Maria sued 
the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department arguing that the department assigned lower 
priority to domestic violence calls. During trial, the 9-1-1 dispatcher stated that it was the 
department’s protocol not to classify domestic violence incidents as emergency calls 
(Blackwell & Vaughn, 2003).  
In another case, Stevens v. Trumbull County Sheriff’s Department (1999), the 
victim, Lisa Stevens, argued she received differential treatment from the police because 
they labeled her relationship with an ex-boyfriend she dated for seven months as a 
domestic relationship (Blackwell & Vaughn, 2003). After the relationship ended, Ms. 
Stevens’ ex-boyfriend, Brian McKimmy, attempted to contact her and reestablish their 
previous relationship. Stevens called 9-1-1 seeking to file a report against McKimmy for 
harassment. The dispatcher told Stevens she would send someone over, but after 
contacting the Lieutenant, he said no one could respond to the call because of holiday 
activities that were taking place that day. The Lieutenant called Stevens to let her know 
that no one would be available to come to her house and instead she should file a 
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complaint over the phone. However, it was during their conversation that the victim 
informed the Lieutenant that McKimmy was currently trying to force his way in the 
home. Stevens was instructed by the Lieutenant to attempt to run from the home and go 
to a neighbor’s house. She did as she was instructed but failed to reach a neighbor’s 
house because McKimmy shot her, leaving her as a quadriplegic. The victim filed a 
lawsuit against the police department stating that her situation was placed as a lower 
priority because it was viewed as a domestic violence situation (Blackwell & Vaughn, 
2003). 
In another case involving inadequate police response to domestic violence calls, 
Schieber v. City of Philadelphia (2003), two police officers responded to a neighbor’s 
report that they heard what sounded like a “serious domestic dispute” taking place at their 
next door neighbor’s house (Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 2003, p. 411). This 
statement was based on the fact that the neighbor stated she could hear horrific screams 
coming from the home (Frantzen & San Miguel, 2009). Upon their arrival, the officers 
conducted a brief interview with the neighbor who had called 9-1-1 and then decided not 
to make entry into the home because, after speaking with the neighbor, they were unsure 
of what exactly they had heard coming from their neighbor’s house. Following the 
incident, the woman who lived in the home was found raped and murdered. The police 
department was sued for failing to adequately investigate the issue. The court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiffs because officers told the neighbor there was nothing they could do, 
but that the neighbor should call them again if they heard anything else coming from 
inside the victim’s home (Frantzen & San Miguel, 2009). 
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One of the most prominent legislative changes to address domestic violence was 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA; Cho & Wilke, 2005). It was 
designed to improve criminal justice enforcement of domestic violence, provide funding 
for interventions and social services to victims, and fund research in the area of intimate 
partner violence. The VAWA was created to focus on grants in six different areas: 
combat violence against women in public, establish rights for immigrant women who are 
victims of domestic violence to file legal petitions, provide education and training to 
judges, establish hotlines and shelters, improve the collection of data pertaining to 
domestic violence, and strengthen existing laws (Cho & Wilke, 2005).  
Few studies have examined outcomes associated with the creation of the Violence 
Against Women Act (Burt, Dyer, Newmark, Norris & Harrell, 1996; Clark, Biddle & 
Martin, 2002). In one study which evaluated a number of federal programs, it was found 
that, in the first year of implementation, more than $23.5 million had been administered 
to the states through federal grants (Burt et al., 1996). Seven years later, Clark et al. 
(2002) uncovered that, in the first five years of the VAWA, federal funds towards 
domestic violence programs increased to roughly $1.6 billion. This money was directed 
towards a number of matters, including investigation and prosecution of violent crimes 
against women and restitution to victims. Additionally, Clark et al. (2002) stated that the 
VAWA was both a beneficial and cost effective policy. With the implementation of 
VAWA, officers responding to DV incidents should be better at referring victims for 
services and informing victims of what options are available to them.  
One significant judicial response in addressing domestic violence was the creation 
of a specialized family court that would process domestic violence cases. The creation of 
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these courts helped to ensure consistent evaluation of domestic violence cases (Fagan, 
1996). Prior to the establishment of courts designed to handle family violence, there was 
the possibility of domestic violence cases receiving a lower priority by the court. These 
courts provide services unique to domestic violence cases such as batterer intervention 
programs, specialized probation supervision for offenders, and access to services for the 
victims. In some domestic violence courts, not only are judges educated in domestic 
violence issues, but prosecutors and some public defenders are as well (Fagan, 1996). 
Having practitioners who are educated about the topic can help to reduce the possibility 
of them having a skewed perception of what domestic violence entails.  
Addressing Domestic Violence Myths through Police Training 
In a unique article by Eigenberg et al. (2012), four major myths regarding the 
issue of domestic violence were outlined. Over the past 40 years, grant money has aided 
in evolving domestic violence legislation (e.g., mandatory arrests, increase in the number 
of domestic violence resources available to victims). As new legislative changes are 
enacted, many police departments must alter procedures to reflect their compliance with 
the law. As police departments change their practices, police training too becomes 
something that is revised. Eigenberg et al. (2012) stress that for any type of police 
training or response to be beneficial, the myths associated with domestic violence must 
first be understood.  
First, contrary to the belief that there is only one type of domestic violence, 
Johnson (2007) outlines four types of intimate partner violence (IPV) that exist, however 
he primarily emphasizes three. These three types include: intimate terrorism, violent 
resistance, and situational violence. Intimate terrorism is characterized by using violence 
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as a way of controlling one’s partner. Furthermore, this type of terrorism occurs 
frequently, is highly unlikely to be mutual, and often times results in serious injury and 
emotional abuse to the victim. Violent resistance is displayed when women who 
experience violence defend themselves or retaliate against their abusive partners. 
Situational violence usually involves both partners acting out as aggressors and the 
violence ranges anywhere from minor to serious (Johnson, 2007). Eigenberg et al. (2012) 
advocate for police training that provides officers with an understanding about the 
different types of intimate partner violence that currently exist. Additionally, more police 
officers need to be educated that instances of the various forms of intimate partner 
violence do occur and they must be able to recognize them (Eigenberg et al., 2012).  
The second myth outlined by Eigenberg et al. (2012) is that most domestic 
violence is relatively minor. In one study conducted by Catalono (2007), the findings 
suggested that intimate partner homicides accounted for 30% of the murders against 
women from 1976 to 2005. Additionally, the National Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence (NCADV; 2011) stated that there are roughly 16,800 homicides and $2.2 
million spent on medical injuries due to domestic violence. The NCADV (2011) also 
found that, in one-third of the female homicides that police respond to, the victims were 
killed at the hands of their intimate partners, and, in approximately 70-80% of domestic 
violence homicides “no matter which partner was killed, the man physically abused the 
woman before the murder” (NCADV, 2011, p. 1). Furthermore, the economic impact of 
domestic violence is said to exceed $5.8 billion each year, with more than half of that 
total being used for direct medical and mental health assistance (NCADV, 2011). Despite 
the numbers indicating that a majority of DV cases are at the misdemeanor level, 
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Eigenberg et al. (2012) argue that the reason for so few domestic violence offenses being 
charged as felony cases is because perhaps a majority of domestic assaults are not being 
charged consistently with legal definitions. Moreover, the researchers argue that a more 
consistent definition of “serious bodily harm” should be established by individual 
officers, police agencies, and attorneys (Eigenberg et al., 2012, p. 129).  
Third, there is a myth that domestic violence is the same as any other type of 
crime. In reality, domestic violence is the number one violent crime reported to police 
and requires a response from officers (Ventura & Davis, 2005; Eigenberg et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, domestic violence involves offenders who have an intimate relationship 
with their victim, and these offenders exert a certain level of power and control over their 
victims. Additionally, the perpetrator often times lives with their victim, and, despite their 
violence, perpetrators claim to love their victims (Eigenberg et al., 2012). It is this 
intimate relationship that often times makes it difficult for victims to leave their abusers. 
Officers need to understand that domestic violence cases need to be responded to 
differently, and they also need to know that it is not as easy for a victim to leave as they 
might think.  
The fourth myth outlined by Eigenberg et al. (2012) states that domestic violence 
incidents are extremely dangerous for police officers. According to the authors, this myth 
can be credited to flawed FBI data and research indicating that officers are more likely to 
die while responding to a domestic violence incident, compared to any other type of call. 
In fact, police officers are more likely to die accidentally due to their own actions or the 
actions of fellow officers rather than while responding to a domestic violence call 
(Garner & Clemmer, 1986; Eigenberg et al., 2012). As previously mentioned, in order for 
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police training and response to domestic violence to be effective, these four 
misconceptions need to be addressed. If addressed, perhaps law enforcement officers can 
come to better understand domestic violence and work to more effectively address the 
issue.  
Lethality Risk Assessments 
Over the past thirty to forty years, police departments throughout the country have 
begun implementing new response techniques to domestic violence incidents (Buzawa, 
2012). One such response that is still being used today has been the implementation of 
the lethality risk assessment (Campbell, 1986; Buzawa, 2012; Klein, 2012). Lethality risk 
assessments are used all over the country to help determine the level of danger abused 
victims have of being severely injured or killed at the hands of their abuser (Campbell, 
1986). One such lethality risk assessment was developed by Jacqueline Campbell (1986). 
Campbell’s (1986) assessment was first introduced in Maryland and is now used in 
thirteen other states. Based on the initial research conducted by Campbell (1986) and her 
colleagues, the lethality risk assessment examines fifteen different variables that are 
shown to distinguish severe intimate partner violence and homicide victims from 
nonlethal abused victims (Campbell, 1986; Buzawa, 2012). Perhaps if officers have 
record of individuals who are shown to have a high lethality risk, they would respond 
faster to future calls for service that are placed by them.  
Again, the overall purpose of the assessment is to pinpoint those individuals who 
are at the highest risk for being seriously injured or killed by their abusers and to connect 
them to the appropriate services within the community (Klein, 2012). In order for a 
victim to be classified as high risk for lethality, they must either answer “yes” to any of 
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the first three questions, or “yes” to any four of the last eight questions. Questions posed 
to victims range from, “Has he/she ever used a weapon against you or threatened you 
with a weapon?” to “Has the abuser ever left you a threatening voice message?” (Klein, 
2012, p. 88). When a victim is identified as being at high risk for homicide or serious 
injury, officers are required to call a 24-hr domestic violence hotline and encourage the 
victim to speak with one of the trained professionals (Klein, 2012). Regardless of 
whether the victim chooses to speak to a hotline professional, police officers, as well as 
community domestic violence professionals are encouraged to follow-up with telephone 
calls or in-person visits to the victim.  
One study focused on the use of Campbell’s (1986) assessment by nurses 
examining 79 women who had been abused. Results of the study support the use of 
Campbell’s lethality risk assessment as a reliable and valid measure of the danger of 
homicide. More specifically, the risk assessment was able to identify women who were 
re-assaulted as being at an elevated risk of being re-victimized. Additionally, women who 
received lower risk assessment scores were found to less likely to be re-assaulted 
(Campbell, 1986). In a study conducted by Dahl (2012) in Minnesota’s Anoka County, 
findings uncovered that, according to local media coverage, prosecutors, judges, and 
probation officers were beginning to incorporate the use of the lethality risk assessment 
when determining bail amount and other offender issues. In another study conducted in 
2003 by Campbell and her colleagues, researchers found the lethality risk assessment to 
be a reliable tool when identifying victims most at risk of homicide or serious injury 
(Campbell et al., 2003; Buzawa, 2012). Despite these findings, researchers acknowledged 
that many of the individuals who administered the lethality risk assessment were more 
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inclined to over-predict, rather than under-predict, considering the consequences of not 
identifying a high-risk victim as high risk (Klein, 2012).   
The use of lethality risk assessments has been shown to be highly effective in 
identifying victims who are at high risk of lethality. In June of 2009, Kansas City, 
Missouri adopted their own lethality assessment program in domestic violence cases 
(Forte, 2011). With this implementation, every Kansas City police officer (N=900) was 
trained to administer the lethality questionnaire. A year after the use of the assessment 
started, the Chief of the Kansas City Police Department stated that the number of 
domestic violence homicides in the city had decreased by 25% and the number of 
domestic violence aggravated assaults declined by seven percent (Forte, 2011). 
Additionally, domestic violence shelters began to see an increase in the number of 
women utilizing their services. It is unclear as to whether these changes were due 
primarily to the lethality risk assessment, but the Kansas City police chief claimed that 
these changes occurred within a one year period of the risk assessment being introduced 
to the police department. In the same study previously mentioned, Dahl (2012) found that 
in Minnesota’s Anoka County, of the 609 assessments they completed from September 
2010 to February 2012, 68% of the incidents were determined to have a victim who was 
at high-risk. Of that percentage of victims, after being informed by officers that they were 
determined to be high risk, 77% of them received on-going services from community 
domestic violence programs (Dahl, 2012). Overall, lethality risk assessments have given 
departments around the country a new way of responding to domestic violence calls.  
While mandatory and other pro-arrest policies, police-based victim services, and 
the use of lethality assessments have all received a fair amount of empirical scrutiny, 
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police response time is one component of police response to domestic violence that has 
been significantly overlooked; however, a few studies have examined police response 
time to other types of incidents. In this next section, a review of literature examining 
police response time will be presented.  
Response Time to Calls for Service 
During the police professionalism era, rapid police response time gained 
considerable importance (Cihan, Zhang, & Hoover, 2012). This attention can be credited 
to police departments attempting to improve their efforts at crime control, responding to 
citizens’ expectations of the department, and deterrence of offenders. It was thought that, 
by reducing response time, those three conditions could be improved (Cihan et al., 2012). 
Since then, police departments across the nation have attempted to reduce their response 
times. In a study conducted prior to the well-known Kansas City Preventive Patrol 
Experiment, Isaac (1967) examined officer response time in relation to the likelihood of 
offender arrest. His findings suggested that a reduction in the time it took officers to 
arrive on scene did in fact increase the likelihood of an arrest being made (Isaac, 1967). 
Years later, researchers conducted a similar study examining police response time 
was the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, completed in Missouri (Kelling, Pate, 
Dieckman & Brown, 1974; Peak, 1997; Roberg, Novak, Cordner, & Smith, 2012). In this 
study, Kelling et al. (1974) sought to determine if rapid response time was effective 
within the Kansas City Police Department. Over a two-year period, researchers collected 
information on Part 1 crimes (i.e., rape, murder, aggravated assault, and arson) in a 
number of areas within Kansas City. Observers also participated in ride-alongs with 
officers where they would collect the travel time for each call. Researchers discovered 
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that police response time yielded no effect on the likelihood of making an arrest or 
making contact with witnesses. They also found that response time was not associated 
with victim satisfaction. Despite these findings indicating that police response time did 
not have a significant effect on an arrest being made or victim satisfaction, the Kansas 
City experiment opened the door for future research on police response time to be 
conducted (Kelling, et al., 1974; Peak, 1997; Roberg, et al., 2012).  
Cihan et al. (2012) state that there is an assumption by police departments that 
through rapid response time, more arrests will be made, leading to a decrease in crime. 
Research has tested this assumption and produced mixed results. More recently, 
researchers have examined rapid response time and the effect it has on apprehending 
burglary suspects (Coupe & Blake, 2005; Cihan et al., 2012). In their 2005 study, Coupe 
and Blake reported that several characteristics including, response time, workload per 
officer, and stage at which the burglary was in, all contributed to the arrest of burglary 
suspects. Consistent with Coupe and Blake (2005), Cihan et al. (2012) found that rapid 
response by the police to in-progress burglary calls affected the probability of an offender 
being arrested.  
Unlike the research in the Kansas City experiment examining police response 
time in relation to suspect apprehension, the findings surrounding victim satisfaction have 
yielded largely positive results. McEwen, Connors, and Cohen (1984) conducted a study 
in four different cities measuring citizen satisfaction and police response time. Their 
research uncovered that, when police have a delayed response time, there is decreased 
citizen satisfaction. Richardson-Foster, Stanley, Miller, & Thomson (2012) had similar 
findings to that of McEwen et al. (1984). Richardson-Foster et al. (2012) conducted a 
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study examining children’s perspectives of police response time to domestic violence. 
Researchers found that among the children interviewed, the time it took police to respond 
to a domestic violence incident was of great importance to them. The children felt that a 
slow response time reflected a lack of priority given to their situation. One child even 
indicated that, if the police had arrived quickly, they could “take him away” (Richardson-
Foster et al., 2012, p. 227).  
As demonstrated through the literature presented thus far, research examining 
officer response time to calls for assistance has yielded mixed results. Some researchers 
have found a significant relationship existing between response time and certain on-scene 
factors, whereas others have not established a relationship. These inconsistencies, along 
with the lack of research examining officer response time specifically to domestic 
violence calls for assistance, demonstrate the need for further research. It has been a topic 
that has been significantly overlooked by researchers in the field. Thus, the current study 
analyzes officer response time to domestic violence calls and explores its potential effects 
on a number of on-scene factors. It is hypothesized by the researcher that the faster 
officers arrive on-scene to DV incidents, the better chance they have to locate the primary 
aggressor, to make an arrest of the suspect, the fewer injuries a victim will sustain, and 
the less likelihood of a victim requiring medical attention. 
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METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
A variety of prior research has been conducted exploring responses to domestic 
violence incidents provided by police, as well as the response time of police officers to 
calls for assistance in non-domestic violence related cases (Coupe & Blake, 2005; Cihan 
et al., 2012). There is, however, a lack of attention given to the influence of officer 
response time to a variety of on-scene factors such as offender presence, offender arrest, 
victim injuries, and if the victim receives medical attention. In order to determine what 
on-scene factors are affected by officer response time to domestic violence calls, the 
present study examined over 300 domestic violence reports from a local police agency.  
Conceptual Definitions 
For the purposes of this study, officer response time was conceptualized, in 
accordance with department record keeping, as the time between an officer’s dispatch 
notification from 9-1-1 to the moment when the officer arrives on-scene. This has been 
used as a valid conceptual definition in previous research examining police response time 
to in-progress burglaries (Cihan et al., 2012). Offender arrest was defined as whether or 
not the responding officer(s) placed the suspect under arrest at the initial incident and 
booked that individual into the local jail on a domestic violence charge. Offender present 
upon officer arrival was characterized as whether or not the primary suspect, as 
determined by the responding officers, was present at the scene of where the initial DV 
incident took place when law enforcement arrived. Presence of physical injuries to the 
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victim upon officer arrival to the scene was conceptualized by the existence of bruises, 
scratches, abrasions, redness of skin, and swelling. This has been used as a valid 
conceptualization in previous studies examining victim injuries in domestic violence 
incidents (Peterson & Bialo-Padin, 2012). Reporting status was defined as the condition 
of the DV incident when it is called into police dispatchers. Lastly, medical attention was 
conceptualized as whether or not the victim required medical attention upon officer 
arrival, or if no medical attention was sought.  
Dependent Variables & Measures 
To determine offender present upon arrival, the Idaho Domestic Violence 
Supplement was examined, specifically the area where officers mark whether the 
offender was present or “gone upon arrival.” This variable was measured as a 
dichotomous variable, with a zero (0) indicating the offender was gone when officers 
arrived on scene, and a one (1) indicating they were present on-scene. The Idaho 
Domestic Violence Supplement (see Appendix, p. 65) is completed by officers when 
responding to any domestic violence call. This form captures a number of  important 
details surrounding the DV incident including: victim offender relationship, victim 
injuries, suspect injuries, domestic violence history, drug and alcohol use, and what 
services, if any, were offered to the victim following the incident.  
To measure offender arrest, an examination of the cover sheet of each report was 
completed. These sheets have an area where officers check the ‘arrest’ box if they did 
make an arrest during the initial incident. This variable was measured with a zero (0) 
indicating the offender was not arrested at the initial incident, a one (1) indicating an 
arrest was made at the initial incident, and a two (2) would illustrate that both parties, 
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offender and victim, were arrested, which is also indicated on the report cover sheet and 
in the report database.  
To measure presence of physical injuries, an examination of the Idaho Domestic 
Violence Supplement was again conducted, focusing specifically on the section where 
officers must indicate whether any injuries are present on the victim and specifying the 
location on the body, as well as the nature of the injury. More specifically, injuries were 
summarized into four categories: non-evident, soft-tissue/bruising, scratches/bleeding, 
and broken bones. Additionally, each of these variables was measured as a dichotomous 
variable with a zero (0) indicating no, and a one (1) being yes.  
Medical attention was measured by analyzing domestic violence supplemental 
forms. More specifically, the researcher examined the section where officers indicate 
what type of medical attention, if any, the victim received. For the purposes of this study, 
medical attention was measured with zero (0) no medical attention, one (1) medical 
attention at initial scene, and two (2) taken to hospital. The above variables were chosen 
by the researcher because they have been examined in previous studies regarding officer 
response time to non-domestic violence related calls.  
Independent Variables & Measures 
Officer response time to domestic violence calls was collected through the 
agency’s CAD system, which pinpointed when an officer received notification of a 
domestic violence disturbance and when exactly they arrived on-scene. Furthermore, in 
using CAD data, this allowed for a very accurate measure of response time due to the 
reduction in human error. For the purposes of this study, response time was collected as a 
continuous variable. This collection allowed for an average response time of all calls to 
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be collected, and it allowed for the study to report on the odds of on-scene factors 
changing based on a reduction or increase in response time.  
Control Variables 
To better understand specific factors affected by officer response time to domestic 
violence incidents, there were a number of variables that needed to be controlled. The 
study controlled for a variety of variables including: victim-offender relationship, 
location of the domestic violence incident, whether or not the primary aggressor (as 
determined by the responding officer[s]) was female, the suspect and victim having a 
child in common, whether or not the victim sustained any physical injuries, medical 
attention received by the victim, type of domestic violence incident, the level of offense, 
reporting status, and whether the incident had any risk factors. All of these variables were 
measured through either officer reports, the domestic violence supplemental form, or the 
agency’s computer aided dispatch database.  
It was important to control for these variables for a number of reasons. First, 
victim-offender relationship is significant because it can affect how an officer handles the 
situation once they are on-scene. For example, the responding officer may choose not to 
arrest either party in an incident involving a couple who has been married for 10+ years 
where an argument occurred and they were throwing objects at one another because 
officers believe it was a marital spat that can be worked out, compared to a couple dating 
for four months involved in a similar incident, regardless of how quickly he/she 
responded to the call. 
Second, location of the incident could affect whether the offender is present when 
law enforcement officers arrive at the scene and if the victim sustained any injuries as a 
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result of the incident. If the DV incident happens in a public area outside of the home, the 
likelihood of the offender being present could possibly diminish, due to the offender 
having easy access to leave the situation. Additionally, if the offenses take place in a 
public area where there are many bystanders present, there could be the chance that the 
victim would not have any injuries to them.  
Third, having a female offender could possibly influence whether the offender is 
arrested at the initial incident. Perhaps officers are less likely to arrest in a situation 
involving a female primary aggressor than they are a male primary aggressor because 
they do not believe the female possess any future threat to the male victim and that she 
was simply upset with the victim rather than continuously abusing him1. Furthermore, 
having a female suspect could potentially influence the likelihood of the victim having 
any physical injuries due to women potentially being smaller than their male peer, 
however, female aggressors could make up for this difference through the use of 
weapons. The influence of a female offender on injuries could also potentially impact 
whether the victim receives medical attention. More specifically, if the victim receives no 
injuries, the likelihood of them receiving medical treatment is significantly reduced. 
Fourth, if the suspect and victim have a child in common, this could potentially 
influence an officer’s decision to arrest the primary suspect. In order to keep the child, or 
children, safe from future domestic violence exposure, responding officers could choose 
to arrest when there is a child on scene, as opposed to when there are no children present. 
Moreover, responding officers make the decision to arrest if it was determined that the 
1 Officers could also respond differently to same sex relationships. More specifically, perhaps they choose 
not to arrest in same sex cases but rather give involved parties a warning and separate them.  
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child was injured or directly involved in the incident in question. This decision could lead 
to the suspect receiving a charge of domestic battery with the enhancement of in the 
presence of a child. 
Fifth, presence of injuries to the victim may potentially influence an officer’s 
decision to arrest, as well as whether or not the victim receives any medical attention.  
Additionally, the more severe the injury, the more likely an officer may be to arrest the 
primary aggressor. Receiving medical attention may also impact the likelihood of the 
offender being arrested. If a victim needs medical attention it could be assumed that their 
injuries were significant enough to warrant medical evaluation, increasing the chances for 
an arrest being made of the offender.  
The reporting status of the DV call needs to be controlled for due to the 
possibility of it influencing a number of on-scene factors. If a call comes in days, even 
weeks, after the incident any injuries that victim may have had could heal, and the 
suspect may not be present when the victim places the call into the police department. 
However, if the call comes in as an assault in-progress, victim injuries are more likely to 
be evident, and the chances for the offender being present increase.  
Lastly, type of domestic violence incident, the level of the offense, and any risk 
factors the officers may uncover while responding may potentially affect whether the 
primary suspect is arrested at the initial incident. For example, an attempted strangulation 
incident is an automatic felony, which significantly influences the officer’s decision to 
arrest, however, in a misdemeanor domestic battery incident with no injuries, officers 
may be less prompted to arrest in that situation. Furthermore, the Idaho Domestic 
Violence Supplement has a risk assessment for dangerousness and lethality incorporated 
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into it (Idaho Risk Assessment for Dangerousness [IRAD]). More specifically, officers 
are advised to ask the victims a number of questions that are listed on the form (e.g., has 
the suspect ever made specific threats to kill the victim, has there been a recent separation 
between parties, ever forced the victim to have sex, demonstrate possessiveness, etc.). 
Some of these questions are italicized, meaning they indicate a high likelihood of 
lethality. Then, based on the answers given by victims they receive a score of 1 – 7, seven 
being the most severe. Additionally, if any of the italicized questions were answered with 
a yes, the score will be indicated with the number they received, plus italicized factors. 
That being said, if officers deem there to be any number of risk factors present when 
completing the domestic violence supplemental form, they could be more inclined to 
arrest the suspect in order to avoid any subsequent incidents.  
Unit of Analysis & Sampling  
Based on the fact that the proposed study involved analyzing police reports to 
measure how quickly officers respond to domestic violence calls, and whether or not that 
response time affects a number of on-scene factors surrounding DV incidents, the unit of 
analysis was social artifacts, specifically police reports. The target population, as well as 
the sampling frame, was also police reports. These reports included items such as fact 
cover sheets, police narrative, the Idaho Domestic Violence Supplement, and any photos 
that were taken at the initial incident. The target population included domestic violence 
reports completed by law enforcement officers between July 1, 2013 and December 31, 
2013 from a local police department. This date range was selected because it allowed for 
reports from different times throughout the year to be examined. For the purposes of this 
study, every report completed within those dates was reviewed and included in the study, 
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making the research design a census, or total population design. By using this particular 
sampling method, every domestic violence police report was gathered from the six month 
period, allowing for a sample size of over 300.  
As previously mentioned, access to the reports needed for the study was provided 
by a local police agency. An examination of officer reports, the domestic violence 
supplemental forms, and CAD data was conducted to gather the relevant information. 
This collection method was selected for a number of reasons. First, it permitted the 
researcher to obtain enough reports to effectively determine if there is a relationship 
between officer response time and on-scene aspects of a DV incident within the study 
area. Second, it included every DV report within the indicated time frame, decreasing the 
bias that can occur if the researcher were to select which reports to include for 
observation, once again helping to increase validity. Third, analyzing reports from 
domestic violence incidents provided the researcher the opportunity to obtain a vast 
amount of information not available through other data collection techniques. For 
example, sending surveys to victims and suspects of domestic violence incidents or 
interviewing them would not work for this particular study. Surveys and interviews 
assume most participants are honest with their answers and they require individuals to 
recall previous events (Babbie, 2013). Additionally, victims and officers would not be 
able to provide an accurate time measure, which could have potentially skewed the 
results of the study.  
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Reliability & Validity 
2Focusing solely on officer reports and supplemental forms involving only 
domestic violence incidents established a largely reliable measure because it reduced the 
chances of including incidents that are not domestic violence related. Additionally, 
tracking response time to domestic violence calls through the agency’s CAD system 
likely produced consistent and valid results. This reliability can be attributed to the fact 
that CAD tracked the response time, rather than the dispatcher, or the responding officer, 
thus reducing possible human error.  
Contained within each supplemental form was a box where officers indicated the 
appearance/attitude of both the suspect and victim. At the top of the list is the option, 
“gone upon arrival.” It was assumed that the officer indicated whether or not the offender 
was present upon arrival. If it was not indicated on the DV Supplemental Form, the 
researcher reviewed the officer narrative that indicated if officers were able to make 
contact with the suspect upon their arrival on-scene. Additionally, in each officer report, 
there is a section in which the officer indicates how each situation was resolved, which 
allowed for this measure to be highly reliable. Furthermore, when each case is opened 
within the departmental database, the first page that comes up lists the parties involved 
with each incident, their role(s), and whether any of the individuals present were arrested. 
The supplemental forms allowed for the researcher to consistently measure which 
incidents involved injuries to the victim. This consistency came from the DV 
2 Working alongside a fellow researcher who was also collecting data from the same domestic violence 
reports allowed for high inter-rater reliability. Moreover, the two researchers coded 5% of all the DV 
reports together to determine whether their findings within the reports were homogeneous. After examining 
5% of officer reports it was determined that the two researcher’s findings were consistent. Based on this 
consistency the two researchers divided up the remaining reports and coded them separately from one 
another. 
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supplemental form being automatically inserted into an officer’s report when it was 
indicated by the officer that they responded to a domestic violence incident.  
Upon examining officer reports, the agency included within this study should be 
following the Idaho State Code when labeling certain incidents as domestic violence. 
This is due to the fact that departments, as well as officers, are trained to recognize and 
appropriately label incidents as they are defined by Idaho law. Considering this 
reasonable assumption, the measure of domestic violence was valid, with little to no 
error. Utilizing existing database records on documented response times presented few 
issues in regards to validity due to its concurrence with department policy.  
Once again, victim injuries were accurately measured from domestic violence 
supplemental forms. It should be noted that a serious limitation existed with officers not 
identifying present injuries on the victim or leaving the injury section blank. Even though 
the supplemental form is automatically inserted into an officer’s domestic violence 
report, it is not a requirement to complete each section. In cases where the injury section 
was incomplete, it made measuring victim injuries difficult, leaving the researcher to rely 
on the officer narrative reports to determine if the victim sustained any injuries.  
Limitations 
Despite the numerous contributions mentioned thus far, there are several 
drawbacks that need to be discussed. A limitation could have existed with regard to the 
accuracy of the response time, but only for officers or dispatchers failing to document the 
exact time the call was received and the exact time of arrival on scene. Moreover, a 
restriction potentially existed with domestic violence incidents not being properly 
identified as DV and coded incorrectly by officers. Additionally, another possible 
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drawback was thought to exist when measuring offender arrest. It was assumed that some 
officers may forget to indicate in their reports how each incident was handled. However, 
by taking those reports and running the case number through the agency’s database, the 
researcher was able to eliminate this limitation.  
Additionally, this particular study examined information included in police officer 
reports. In choosing to use this particular method, there was no definitive method of 
determining the level of accuracy of information included in the reports. Officers may fail 
to gather all the details surrounding each incident, reducing the amount of information the 
researcher would be able to compile. Second, by only including domestic violence reports 
from one agency, generalizability to other areas around the United States is not 
applicable. Despite this drawback, it was not the intent of this study to generalize the 
findings to other areas of the country. Rather, it attempted to acknowledge that a 
relationship may exist between police response time to domestic violence calls for 
assistance and various factors associated with DV incidents, thus demonstrating the need 
for continued research in other areas throughout the country.  
Data & Statistical Analyses  
For the purposes of this study, a bivariate analysis was first conducted to examine 
the correlation between the four dependent variables, and the single independent variable. 
Additionally, logistic regression was then used to further examine the relationship 
between officer response time (a continuous independent variable) and the four 
categorical dependent variables (offender presence, offender arrest, victim injuries, and 
victim medical attention), while controlling for other pertinent variables.  
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Logistic regression is the most appropriate analysis because the dependent 
variables examined within the study are nominal-level and dichotomous, where as an 
OLS regression would require the use of continuous dependent variables. Additionally, it 
was deemed as the most appropriate statistical analysis for this study because it uses 
exponential beta (Exp[B]) to give an odds ratio, and this odds ratio allows you to find the 
probability of the dependent variable occurring based on the value of the independent 
variable. Moreover, when the value of exponential beta is greater than one, the 
probability of the higher dependent variable category increases, and when the value of 
exponential beta is less than one, the probability of higher dependent category decreases. 
In instances where the independent variable is continuous, it can be interpreted that a 
single unit increase in the independent variable corresponds to an increase or decrease in 
the dependent variable. Furthermore, it can be used to control for a number of other 
potential influencing factors. The following section provides the results for each of the 




Table 1 includes descriptive analyses for all the variables included in the study. 
Based on the data presented in the table, the majority of incidents were labeled as 
domestic battery (65.8%), followed by domestic battery in the presence of a child 
(17.1%), and attempted strangulation (10.7%). Domestic verbal had the fewest number of 
reports at only two (2) reports in the entire data set. Additionally, about 90% of the 
reports only had one (1) domestic violence related charge and roughly 83% of the 
incidents included in the study were misdemeanor offenses. A significant portion of 
reports in the sample included a victim and offender who were either currently married 
(44.0%), or cohabitating together (42.6%). Interestingly, the number of incidents where 
the suspect and victim had a child in common was split evenly, with 49.9% of cases 
having a child in common and 49.9% not having a child in common. Moreover, of the 
reports analyzed in this study, over 80% of the domestic violence incidents occurred 
within a residence, and 15% of incidents occurred outside the home.  
Of the 345 reports examined, a little over 50% of them included non-evident 
injuries to the victim, followed by soft tissue/bruising (19.8%). In only one case did the 
victim sustain any broken bones or internal injuries.3 Additionally, around 90% of 
victims did not receive any type of medical attention at the initial incident or immediately 
3 It should be noted that officers can check more than one injury box if the victim has sustained multiple 
injuries. 
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following the incident. From the reports included in this study, 61% had an offender 
present when responding officers arrived on-scene. However, of the 345 incidents 
examined, there was an offender arrest made in only 38.8% of cases. Furthermore, 18% 
of incidents involved a female offender. Roughly three-quarter of all calls (73.1%) of 
calls came into the police department as assault in progress. Additionally, only 35.2% of 
calls were said to be non-emergency calls. Lastly, the overall average response time 
given by responding officers was about eight and a half minutes. However, it should be 
noted that the median response time was seven minutes and the 8.5 minute average could 
be a reflection of a few significant outliers. 
Table 1  
Descriptive Analyses 
Variables Code N % 
Type of offense 0 = Attempted Strangulation 37 10.7% 
 1 = Domestic Assault 6 1.7% 
 2 = DA in presence of child 11 3.2% 
 3 = Domestic Battery 227 65.8% 
 4 = DB in presence of child 59 17.1% 
 5 = Domestic Disturbance 3 0.9% 
 6 = Domestic Verbal 2 0.6% 
    
Child in Common 0 = No 172 49.9% 
 1 = Yes 172 49.9% 
    
Number of DV charges 1 = one 311 90.1% 
 2 = two 29 8.4% 
 3 = three 5 1.4% 
    
Vic/Offender Relationship 0 = Spouse 151 44.0% 
 1 = Former Spouse 16 4.7% 
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 2 = Cohabitants 146 42.6% 
 3 = Former Cohabitants 8 2.3% 
 4 = Dating/Engaged 9 2.6% 
 5 = Former Dating/Engaged 13 3.8% 
    
Current CPO/NCO 0 = No 320 98.2% 
 1 = Yes 6 1.8% 
    
Risk Assessment 0 = 1-3 Factors 235 86.7% 
 1 = 4-5 Factors 33 12.2% 
 2 = 6-7 Factors 3 1.1% 
    
Level of Offense 0 = Info Report 6 1.7% 
 1 = Misdemeanor 287 83.2% 
 2 = Felony 52 15.1% 
    
Offender Present On Arrival 0 = No 133 38.7% 
 1 = Yes 211 61.3% 
    
Location of Incident 0 = Residence 293 84.9% 
 1 = Vehicle 8 2.3% 
 2 = Public Area 25 7.2% 
 3 = Other 19 5.5% 
    
Offender Arrest at Initial 0 = No 208 60.3% 
 1 = Yes 134 38.8% 
    
Female Offender 0 = No 283 82.0% 
 1 = Yes 62 18.0% 
    
Presence of Victim Injuries 0 = Non-Evident 181 52.6% 
 1 = Soft-Tissue (Bruising) 68 19.8% 
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 2 = Scratches/Bleeding 38 11.0% 
 3 = Broken Bones/Internal 1 0.3% 
 4 = Multiple Injuries 56 16.3% 
    
Non-Evident Injuries 0 = No 163 47.4% 
 1 = Yes 181 52.6% 
    
Soft Tissue Injury (Bruising) 0 = No 220 64.0% 
 1 = Yes 124 36.0% 
    
Scratches or Bleeding 0 = No 251 73.0% 
 1 = Yes 93 27.0% 
    
Broken Bones 0 = No 341 99.1% 
 1 = Yes 3 0.9% 
    
Medical Attention 0 = No medical attention 308 90.1% 
 1 = Medical attention at scene 14 4.1% 
 2 = Taken to hospital 20 5.8% 
    
Reporting Status 0 = Assault in Progress 250 73.1% 
 1 = After Incident (same day) 52 15.2% 
 2 = 1 or more days after 40 11.6% 
    
Non-Emergency Dispatch 0 = No 223 64.8% 
 1 = Yes 121 35.2% 
All missing values have been excluded 
Response Time (minutes) – mean = 8.58; mode = 7.00; SD = 11.21 




As presented in Table 2, a bivariate analysis was conducted to examine the 
correlation between officer response time and offender presence on-scene. The matrix 
demonstrates that there is a significant relationship between response time and offender 
the offender being present on-scene. More specifically, it was found that low response 
time was correlated with an offender being present on-scene (r = -0.125). Table 2 also 
summarizes a bivariate analysis for officer response time and the offender being arrested 
at the initial incident. As indicated in the matrix, it was determined that there was a 
significant relationship between the two variables. Moreover, it was found that a 
reduction in response time was correlated with an offender arrest being made during the 
initial incident (r = -0.129). Additionally, it was found that a significant relationship 
exists between and offender being present and an offender arrest being made (r = 0.463). 
Table 2  
Bivariate Analysis: Offender Present, Arrest and Response Time 
 Response Time Offender Present Offender Arrest 
Response Time Pearson Correlation 1 -0.125* -0.129* 
N 341 340 341 
Offender Present Pearson Correlation -0.125* 1 0.463** 
N 340 344 344 
Offender Arrest Pearson Correlation -0.129* 0.463** 1 
N 341 344 345 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
4 A bivariate analysis was also conducted examining the relationship between response time and victim 
injuries, as well as if the victim received medical attention. There was found to be no significant 
relationship in either matrix, however, a logistic regression model was still conducted for each to further 
examine the relationship while controlling for other variables.  
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Logistic Regression 
Table 3 includes the logistic regression model analyzing the potential effect 
response time could have on the likelihood of an offender being present on-scene. The 
model controls for three other variables: location of the incident, reporting status of the 
incoming call, victim-offender relationship, and whether the two primary parties have a 
child in common. For the purposes of this model, response time was coded as a 
continuous variable, and the dependent variable, offender present, was coded 
dichotomously, with zero (0) indicating the offender was not present, and one (1) 
signaling the offender was present on-scene when officers arrived. Additionally, location 
was collapsed into a dichotomous variable with zero (0) representing that the incident 
occurred within a residence, and one (1) the domestic violence incident occurred outside 
the home (e.g., vehicle, roadway, store). Location was controlled for due to the 
hypothesized possibility that an offender is more likely to be present when officers arrive 
if the incident occurs within the home, rather than in a public location. Reporting status 
was also collapsed into a dichotomous variable in which zero (0) means the call came 
into the police department as an assault in-progress situation; meaning the incident was 
currently taken place or the call was being placed immediately after the incident, and one 
(1) for incidents that were called in as not an assault in-progress situation; meaning the 
incident was reported to the police agency hours after it had occurred. Reporting status 
was controlled for due to the possibility of an offender not being present if the call is 
reported after the incident. When a call comes into dispatch as an active assault in 
progress, the suspect may have less time to flee the scene before officers arrive. Victim-
offender relationship was also coded as a dichotomous variable, zero (0) indicating the 
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two primary parties, as determined by the responding officers, are in a married 
relationship (e.g., spouse), and one (1) meaning the two primary parties are involved in 
some other type of relationship (e.g., cohabitants, former spouse, dating/engaged). 
Victim-offender relationship was controlled for because of the potential for an offender 
being less likely to leave an incident if they are married to their victim, than if they are 
dating or co-habitants. Lastly, child in common was coded as a dichotomous variable, 
zero (0) no, and one (1) yes. It was controlled for due to the possibility that, in an incident 
where the victim and offender have a child in common, the suspect could potentially be 
less likely to flee the scene due to them not wanting to leave the child alone with the 
other party.  
Table 3  
Logistic Regression Model: Response Time on Offender Present 
Variable B S.E. Wald Exp(B) 
Response Time -0.003 0.014 0.052 0.997 
Location -0.570 0.358 2.528 0.566 
Reporting Status -2.510 0.320 61.406 0.081* 
V/O Relationship -0.785 0.276 8.086 0.456* 
Child in Common -0.062 0.266 0.055 0.940 
*p < .05 
All missing values have been excluded 
In the logistic regression model represented in Table 3, response time was not 
found to have a significant effect on whether the offender was present on-scene when 
officers arrived. Reporting status was, however, found to have a significant effect on 
offender presence. Moreover, it was found that when a call came in one or more days 
after the incident, the odds of an offender being present decreased 91.9% (B = -2.510; p < 
.05). Additionally, the model showed victim-offender relationship to also have a 
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significant effect on whether the offender was present when officers arrived. More 
specifically, it was found that the odds of an offender being present decreased 54.4% if 
the victim and offender were involved in something other than a spousal relationship (B = 
-0.785; p < .05).  
Table 4 displays the logistic model examining the effect of officer response time 
on the likelihood of offender arrest at the initial incident. Response time was again used 
as a continuous variable and offender arrest was coded dichotomously as zero (0) no, and 
one (1) yes. For the purposes of this model, a large number of other variables had to be 
controlled for: female offender, presence of injuries, risk assessment, child in common, 
medical attention received, type of domestic violence offense, level of the offense, and 
the victim offender relationship. Female offender was coded as a dichotomous variable, 
zero (0) indicating the primary suspect, as determined by officers, was not a female, and a 
one (1) for if the offender was female. The offender being female was controlled for due 
to the possibility that perhaps officers are more or less likely to arrest in an incident 
where they have determined that the primary aggressor was female. Presence of injuries 
was collapsed into a dummy variable with the victim having non-evident injuries or some 
type of evident injury or injuries. Officers will be more likely to arrest a suspect when 
there are visible injuries to the victim, which could influence the results of the model. 
Furthermore, for each domestic violence incident that takes place, responding officers are 
required to complete an Idaho Domestic Violence Supplement which assigns lethality 
numbers to each case. Numbers range from zero to seven, seven or an italicized factor 
being the most severe. For the purposes of this model, risk assessment was collapsed into 
a dichotomous variable with zero (0) indicating the risk assessment was 1 – 3, and one 
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(1) meaning the risk assessment was from 4 – 7. This variable was collapsed because a 
majority of incidents (86.7%) had a risk assessment ranging from 1 – 3 factors and 13.3% 
of cases had a risk assessment of 4 – 7 factors. Furthermore, italicized factors were also 
broken into a dichotomous variable with zero (0) representing there were no italicized 
factors, and a one (1) indicating there were italicized factors. Risk assessment, as well as 
italicized factors, was controlled for because an offender could be more likely to be 
arrested when there is an assessment ranging from 4 – 7 and/or italicized factors, as 
opposed to 1 – 3 factors and no italicized factors. Child in common was coded similar to 
that of Table 2 and was controlled for because, if the involved parties have a child in 
common, an officer might be more likely to arrest the offender to protect the safety of the 
child. Or, officers may be less likely to arrest because they do not want to remove the 
child from his or her parent’s care. Medical attention was collapsed into a dichotomous 
variable (no medical attention received vs. medical attention received). For the purposes 
of this model, type of domestic violence offense was collapsed into a dichotomous 
variable (zero (0) = domestic battery, and one (1) = other (e.g., domestic assault, 
attempted strangulation, domestic battery in the presence of a child). Type of offense was 
controlled for because, in attempted strangulation offenses or incidents involving 
children, responding police officers could be more likely to arrest than in domestic 
battery incident. Similarly, level of the offense was controlled for because officers are 
potentially more apt to arrest in a felony case than in a minor misdemeanor incident. 
Lastly, victim-offender relationship was once again used as a dichotomous variable 
(spouse vs. non-spouse). Moreover, it was used as a control variable due to the potential 
effects it could have on an officer’s decision to arrest. More specifically, officers may be 
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less inclined to arrest a couple who has been married for ten plus years, but could be 
more inclined to arrest in a situation involving a cohabitating couple who has been dating 
for less than a year.  
Table 4  
Logistic Regression: Response Time on Offender Arrest 
Variable B S.E. Wald Exp(B) 
Response Time -0.048 0.024 4.018 0.953* 
Female Offender 1.389 0.397 12.222 4.009* 
Presence of Injuries 0.452 0.290 2.428 1.571 
Risk Assessment 0.233 0.373 0.392 1.263 
Italicized Factors -0.705 0.399 3.119 0.494 
Child in Common -0.415 0.284 2.131 0.660 
Medical Attention -0.412 0.546 0.571 0.662 
Type of Offense -0.933 0.362 6.639 0.393* 
Level of Offense -1.496 0.524 8.148 0.224* 
V/O Relationship -0.208 0.286 0.526 0.813 
*p < .05 
All missing values have been excluded 
As indicated in Table 4, response time was shown to have a minimally significant 
effect on the odds of an offender being arrested. Specifically, the odds of an offender 
being arrested decreased 4.7% for every additional minute of response time (B = -0.048; 
p < .05). Furthermore, having a primary suspect, as determined by responding officers, 
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who was female was found to increase the odds of an arrest being made by 300.9% (B = 
1.389; p < .05). The logistic regression model also found the type of offense for which 
the suspect was being charged with to have a significant effect on them being arrested. It 
was found that having a misdemeanor offense decreased the odds of an arrest being made 
by 77.6% (B = -1.496; p < .05). Additionally, having an offender who had committed a 
domestic battery offense decreased the odds of an arrest being made by 60.7% (B =   
-0.933; p < .05). These findings are consistent with other research indicating that severity 
of the offense is a strong predictor of decision making with the justice system 
(Gottfredson, 1987).  
Table 5 presents the logistic regression model analyzing the potential effect of 
officer response time on likelihood of physical injuries to the victim. Additionally, the 
model controlled for three variables: reporting status of the incoming call, whether or not 
the primary suspect, as determined by responding officers, is female, and the location of 
the incident. Once again, response time was coded as a continuous variable, and victim 
injuries was coded dichotomously with zero (0) indicating injuries, as determined by the 
responding officers, were non-evident, and one (1) meaning the victim had evident 
injuries (e.g., bruising, scratches, bleeding, and/or broken bones). Similar to Table 1, 
reporting status and location were collapsed into dichotomous variables and coded. 
Reporting status was controlled for due to the fact that, if a call comes in as an assault in 
progress, the victim could potentially have an increased chance of having some form of 
injury, as opposed to the call coming in hours, maybe even days, after the initial incident. 
Additionally, location of the incident was controlled for due to the offender being less 
likely to injure their victim in a public area where there are multiple witnesses, as 
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opposed to in the confinement of their home. Female offender was coded identically to 
the way it was in Table 3. Having a female offender was controlled for because having a 
female offender could influence the chances of the victim having injuries. Typically, 
females are smaller than males and, because of this; a male victim could potentially 
sustain fewer injuries than a female victim, thus influencing the results.5  
Table 5  
Logistic Regression: Response Time on Victim Injuries (non-evident vs. evident) 
Variable B S.E. Wald Exp(B) 
Response Time -0.024 0.017 2.174 0.976 
Reporting Status 0.565 0.266 4.501 1.760* 
Female Offender 0.443 0.292 2.292 1.557 
Location of Incident 0.363 0.318 1.301 1.437 
Same Sex 0.542 0.689 0.620 1.720 
*p < .05 
All missing values have been excluded 
As indicated in Table 5, the only variable found to have a significant effect on 
victim injuries was the reporting status of the call. More specifically, it was found that the 
odds of the victim having evident injuries increased 76% when a call came in as an 
assault in-progress situation (B = 0.565; p < .05). Response time was once again found to 
not have a significant effect on injuries to the victim. 
5 The model represented in Table 4 also controlled same sex relationships and found that there was no 
significant effect of same sex relationships on whether the victim had any evident injuries. 
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Table 6 includes the findings for the logistic regression model analyzing the 
effects of officer response time on likelihood of the victim requiring medical attention, 
both at the initial incident or later at a hospital. In this model, control variables were 
reporting status, location of the incident, having a female offender and the victim having 
injuries. Again, response time was coded as a continuous variable and medical attention 
was measured as either zero (0), not having received any medical attention, or one (1), 
having received some type of medical attention from paramedics and/or the hospital. As 
in previous tables, reporting status, location of the incident, and female offender were 
collapsed into dichotomous variables. Furthermore, presence of injuries was also 
collapsed into a dichotomous variable, zero (0) meaning responding officers saw no 
evident injuries present on the victim, and one (1) the victim had some form of evident 
injury or injuries (e.g., bleeding, scratches, bruising). Reporting status was again 
controlled because, if a call comes in a day or more following the incident, the victim 
may no longer require immediate medical attention, thus affecting the results. 
Additionally, similar to Table 6, if the incident takes place in public, the victim may be 
less likely to experience any injuries, lessening the likelihood medical attention will be 
needed. Again, having a female offender can influence the possibility of victim injuries 
which can influence if medical attention is required of the victim. Finally, presence of 
injuries to the victim was controlled for because like previously stated with the other 
control variables, if responding officers find no evident injuries to the victim, the chances 
of the victim receiving medical attention are significantly reduced.  
 
47 
Table 6  
Logistic Regression: Response Time on Medical Attention (not received vs. received) 
Variable B S.E. Wald Exp(B) 
Response Time -0.010 0.024 0.162 0.990 
Reporting Status 0.866 0.404 4.588 2.377* 
Location of Incident 0.193 0.521 0.137 1.212 
Female Offender -19.197 4936.306 0.000 0.000 
Presence of Injuries 1.811 0.474 14.581 6.114* 
*p < .05 
All missing values have been excluded 
As with previous models, Table 6 shows that response time was not shown to 
have a significant effect on whether the victim received any medical attention. However, 
once again, responding to an assault in-progress call increased the odds of the victim 
needing medical attention by 137.7% (B = 0.866; p < .05). Additionally, the presence of 
evident injuries to the victim was found to increase the odds of medical attention 511.4% 




The intention of this study was to explore whether officer response time to 
domestic violence calls for assistance had any effect on a number of on-scene factors. 
Response time to domestic violence calls is an area where research is significantly 
lacking. It was hypothesized that decreasing response time would increase the likelihood 
of the offender being present upon officer arrival, it would raise the chances of the 
offender being arrested at the initial incident, the victim would experience fewer injuries, 
and the need for medical attention would decrease. 
For the purposes of this study, a review of 345 local domestic violence incidents 
from July 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013 was conducted. It was established that 
response time yielded no significant effect in any of the four models except when 
examining its influence on offender arrest. More specifically, it was found that, the odds 
of an offender being arrested decreased 4.7% for every minute of response time. Despite 
this low percentage, the finding is consistent with the assertions made by Isaac (1967), 
Coupe and Blake (2005), and Cihan et al. (2012) in which the researchers discovered that 
a reduction in the time it took officers to arrive on scene to calls for assistance did 
increase the likelihood of an arrest being made. However, the findings of this particular 
study and those previously mentioned depict the opposite of what was uncovered in the 
Kansas City experiment (Kelling et al., 1974). In the Kansas City study, researchers 
determined that police response time yielded no effect on the chances of making an 
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offender arrest. It should be noted that each of these studies examined police response 
time to a number of different calls (e.g., Part 1 crimes, burglaries, domestic violence) 
however, with the exception of the Kansas City experiment; results from the studies are 
consistent due to them all demonstrating that a reduction in response time increases the 
odds of offender arrest.  
One explanation for response time not yielding any significant effects in any of 
the models is that the city under study, despite being the capitol city, is a fairly small 
metropolitan area. Moreover, Boise is a less populated capitol city which decreases the 
amount of traffic congestion officers have to maneuver, as well as the number of 9-1-1 
calls they receive from the public. Additionally, the Boise area is fairly well laid out, 
meaning there are a number of different roads police officers can utilize to get to one 
area. These route options allow officers more options if one area of the city is 
experiencing a high amount of traffic volume.  
Another potential explanation is the police department that was evaluated in this 
study assigns certain officers to specific locations around the city, making officers 
responsible for patrolling and responding to calls that occur within that radius. In 
assigning individual police officers to locations, this allows for officers to be able to 
respond to calls in a timely manner. Now, if all the officers in a particular area are busy 
working another call, an officer from a neighboring district can help cover, however, 
even then the response time to a call for service should not be that long since the districts 
neighbor one another. This setup could be a primary explanation for why officer response 
time yielded no effect on the other variables. More specifically, this area is already small 
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compared to other urban cities and, with the police department sectioning the city off into 
zones, response time for calls would hypothetically not be delayed. 
It came as no surprise that results from each of the models showed reporting 
status as having a significant effect on each of the dependent variables. Hypothetically, if 
a call came in as an assault in progress, as opposed to after the initial incident, an 
offender is potentially more likely to be present, the offender is more likely to be 
arrested, physical injuries to the victim are more likely to be present, which could warrant 
the victim needing some sort of medical attention.  As indicated in Table 5, an assault in-
progress call increased the possibility of the victim needing medical attention by 137.7 
percent. As was argued by Peterson and Bialo-Padin (2012), officer response time can 
affect the ability to gather evidence on-scene. When officers respond to an in-progress 
call, they are more likely to be able to gather evidence at the scene. Moreover, this 
evidence comes in the form of interviews with the suspect, victim, and witnesses, 
assessing damage that could be done to the location in which the incident occurred, and 
photos of any potential fresh physical injuries to the victim. Now, the ability to gather 
most of this evidence relies heavily on the hope that, when a domestic violence incident 
occurs, it will be reported immediately without delay.  
One surprising result was that, in cases where there was a female offender, the 
likelihood of an arrest being made increased by roughly 300 percent. This was surprising 
considering statistics show that women are more likely to be the victims of domestic 
violence (U.S. Department of Justice Statistics, 2005) rather than perpetrators. It would 
be interesting to examine what factors resulted in the determination of the females as 
primary aggressors. Perhaps, in the cases where the female was determined as the 
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primary aggressor, she was instead acting in self-defense against her batterer. 
Additionally, it could be that the male was the initial aggressor and the female was 
simply defending herself, which is why the male had evident physical injuries, thus 
leaving officers under the impression the female was the primary aggressor.  
It was also established in one of the models that offender arrest was influenced 
significantly by the level of the offense (e.g., misdemeanor or felony) and the type of 
domestic violence offense (e.g., domestic battery or other). Moreover, officers arrested 
more often in felony incidents when the offender had committed a more serious domestic 
offense (e.g., attempted strangulation, domestic battery in the presence of a child).6 
Again, this finding is consistent with prior research indicating severity of offense 
influences decisions throughout the justice process (Gottfredson, 1987).  
Despite officer response time having no significant effect in three of the four 
models, the current study did uncover some interesting findings. Moreover, these 
significant findings should be noted and examined for potential follow-up studies. 
Additionally, based on the conclusions of this study there are some specific policy 
recommendations and suggestions for future research that need to be addressed. 
Policy Recommendations 
As the response to domestic violence has changed, so has police training. Police 
departments around the country continually revise their DV training to reflect the changes 
taking place surrounding domestic abuse. According to White (2007), departments offer 
DV training for their officers on a wide range topics, including signs and indicators of 
6 It should be noted that the researcher tested for possible multicollinearity issues between level of offense 
and type of offense and found no issues were present. (VIF = 1.000). 
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abuse, services available to DV victims, the types of incidents that are considered 
domestic violence according to state statutes, and other specialized trainings that vary by 
department. Despite the increasing presence of domestic violence training for police 
officers, there are three other training practices upon which departments should improve 
(Mills, 1998; Coulter, Kuehnle, Byers, & Alfonso, 1999; Lee et al., 2012; Eigenberg et 
al., 2012; Peterson, & Bialo-Padin, 2012; Leisenring, 2012).  
Mills (1998) suggests improvements in officers’ knowledge surrounding the 
services available to the victims of domestic violence. This knowledge would be 
beneficial in regards to rapid police response time because allowing victims to feel like 
they matter can encourage them to seek out available services. It was also recommended 
that, instead of police departments spending more time and money on implementing 
mandatory policies, they should use those resources towards developing new programs 
for victims of DV incidents and training officers on how to inform victims of those 
services. According to Mills (1998), victims often feel helpless following their 
experience and, by offering more programs and improving training, police officers can 
help victims gain back some sense of independence. Mills (1998) also stresses the 
importance of officers being knowledgeable in distinguishing what types of services are 
appropriate for what victims. Domestic violence can be very complex, and officers 
should be trained on how to appropriately respond to each case (Mills, 1998; Eigenberg 
et al., 2012; Peterson & Bialo-Padin, 2012).  
Eigenberg et al. (2012) and Peterson & Bialo-Padin (2012) both address the need 
for improved education on collecting evidence at the scene of domestic violence 
incidents. Due to the difficulty in prosecuting minor domestic violence cases, officers 
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need to understand and be informed on the importance of adequate evidence collection 
(Peterson & Bialo-Padin, 2012). Often times the evidence collected by officers during 
DV calls is used by prosecutors to build their case against the suspect. With evidence 
collection being extremely pertinent to domestic violence cases it allows for police 
officers and court members to see the effects domestic violence can have on its victims, it 
is recommended that officers need to be disciplined on how to collect evidence, and do so 
properly (Eigenberg et al., 2012; Peterson & Bialo-Padin, 2012). Peterson & Bialo-Padin 
(2012) and Eigenberg et al. (2012) even go a step further in their recommendations and 
specify types of evidence collection where more training is needed. Obtaining victim and 
offender statements, photographing injuries, photographing the scene, documenting the 
offenders’ injuries or lack of injuries, and documenting other evidence such as weapons 
or threatening communication are many of the areas suggested for improvement. 
Additionally, rapid response given by responding police officers can better the chances of 
them being to collect all the relevant evidence present at the scene without allowing the 
suspect or victim time to alter the scene in any way.  
The collection of evidence in domestic violence cases sends a message to suspects 
that their actions have not gone unnoticed and there will be consequences (Peterson & 
Bialo-Padin, 2012). Improved training on evidence collection can strengthen the case 
presented by prosecutors and increase conviction rates, which ultimately leads to more 
domestic violence offenders being held responsible for their actions. By strengthening 
one’s case against domestic violence offenders, prosecutors can better the chances of 
having the batterer seek help for their violent tendencies, or in some instances, make sure 
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they spend time behind bars before their violence escalates until it becomes lethal 
(Peterson & Bialo-Padin, 2012; Eigenberg et al., 2012).  
The last area that researchers continue to strongly recommend improvement on is 
training officers to recognize their own biases towards domestic violence cases (Coulter 
et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2012; Leisenring, 2012). In each of their studies, Lee et al. (2012), 
Coulter et al, (1999), and Leisenring (2012) acknowledge various biases shown to exist 
among officers who respond to domestic violence incidents. These misconceived 
perceptions include stereotypes and biases surrounding social class and sexual 
preference, which individuals are the victims of domestic violence, and misguided beliefs 
on how victims respond to assistance. The research conducted suggests a number of areas 
where training could improve to reduce biases. These include awareness classes that 
sensitize officers to race biases that exist in arrest decisions, increased education on how 
to interact with domestic violence victims, and expanding teaching and education on how 
to set personal beliefs aside in order to better understand why victims react differently to 
domestic violence situations (Coulter et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2012; Leisenring, 2012). 
With increased research being conducted and new legislation continually being passed, 
the response to domestic violence will undoubtedly continue to expand. With this 
expansion, it is imperative that police departments implement evidence-based training 
into their practices (Eigenberg et al., 2012). 
To address one of the most prominent findings within this study, having a female 
offender increasing the chances of arrest by roughly 300%, police departments should 
implement, if they do not already have it, primary aggressor training. According to 
Eigenberg et al. (2012), it is important for officers to understand that there are a number 
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of types of domestic violence. Like previously mentioned, according to Johnson (2007), 
there are three types of intimate partner violence: intimate terrorism, violent resistance, 
and situational violence. Specifically, for the purposes of this study, officers need to be 
able to identify when one is experiencing violent resistance. Johnson (2007) states that 
violent resistance is exhibited when women who are experiencing violence from their 
intimate partners defend and retaliate against the abuser. This retaliation can come in the 
form of fighting back against the abuse by physically defending themselves. Perhaps one 
of the reasons for females being arrested at an increasingly higher rate in this study was 
because officers did not know the signs of violent resistance. Instead, they determined the 
females were the primary aggressors in those cases. According to Pagelow’s (1981) 
study, in a sample of women from Florida and California domestic violence shelters, 71% 
reported they had reacted to their abuse with violence of their own. This is not to say that 
females are never the dominant abuser, which is a very distinct possibility, however, 
police training could help to make a clearer distinction between the two forms. In 
implementing domestic violence primary aggressor training, officers can become more 
skilled at establishing who initiated the violence. Additionally, officers should be made 
aware of how arresting the wrong individual could lead to a number of consequences 
such as victims not trusting the justice system to help protect them, batterers not being 
held accountable and believing they can get away with their behavior in the future, and in 
some cases, children not having trust in the police to protect them or the parent who is 
being abused.  
Not only should police officers be trained when they are initially hired on, but 
officers should be required to complete domestic violence primary aggressor training 
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every two years. By requiring officers to complete the training program every two years, 
police departments can ensure they are using up to date evidence-based practices and that 
their officers are trained to adequately respond to DV incidents. One such agency that has 
strived to educate their officers about the identification of the primary aggressor is the 
San Diego Police Department (Strack, 1998). In 1998, with the assistance of a grant from 
the Violence Against Women Grants Office, San Diego Police Department developed a 
specialized domestic violence unit and increased the number of domestic violence 
trainings given to their officers. More specifically, the agency incorporated training in the 
areas of mutual combat, self defense mechanisms used by victims, understanding why 
women use violence against their aggressors, offensive versus defensive injuries, and 
being able to identify when they are dealing with a practiced abuser. A year following the 
implementation of the DV unit and the new trainings, the San Diego Association of 
Governments conducted an evaluation of the unit (Pennell & Burke, 2002). In their 
findings, the researchers stated that prior to the 40-hour training domestic violence 
officers received; they were unable to identify primary aggressors in 6% of cases, 
however, following the training this number dropped to only 2%. Additionally, prior to 
training, suspects were arrested in 33% of domestic violence cases, and after training this 
number increased to 42% of cases resulted in a suspect being arrest on-scene (Pennell & 
Burke, 2002). The training(s) and work being conducted in the San Diego police 
department should encourage more departments around the country to refine their 




This study was the first to examine the effect of officer response time on a 
number of on-scene factors (i.e., offender presence, offender arrest, victim injuries and 
medical attention). It was hypothesized that having a faster response time to domestic 
violence cases would increase the chances of an offender being present on-scene when 
officers arrived, increase the likelihood of a suspect arrest being made, decrease the 
chances for injury to the victim, and minimize the chances of a victim requiring medical 
attention. Despite these propositions, the researcher found that a decrease in response 
time only had a significant effect on one of the dependent variables; offender arrest. 
Although an effect was only found to be significant in one of the models, future research 
should still be conducted. A single study cannot stand as the one and only test of a 
hypothesis. Continuous research specific to officer response time to domestic violence 
calls should be completed to better understand if a possible relationship exists. Even 
though there was no significant relationship found within this research study, there could 
be one found in other police departments around the country.   
Additionally, future research should be conducted examining the benefits of 
agencies implementing primary aggressor training into their training programs. 
Expanding the research conducted on the effects of primary aggressor training can allow 
for more departments to offer the best evidence based practices to their officers. If 
departments are allocating funds to implement training courses for their officers, they 




Based on the significance of having a female primary aggressor and an arrest 
being made, continued research should be conducted regarding this finding. Research 
already exists regarding women using violence as a way of defending themselves against 
their batterers when they feel there are no other alternatives, however, more research 
should be done examining why these women are being arrested as primary aggressors 
(Saunders, 1986; Hester, 2012; Langhinrichsen-Rohling, McCullars & Misra, 2012). Are 
officers not correctly identifying who the primary aggressor is in domestic violence 
incidents, or are is there something else occurring? If continued research is conducted 
regarding this issue, perhaps fewer women will be arrested for domestic violence when 




Despite finding no significant relationship between officer response time to 
domestic violence calls and a number of on-scene factors, this study did uncover that 
perhaps more should be done to train police officers in determining who the primary 
aggressors are in DV incidents. Considering that police officers are typically the first 
responders to domestic violence calls for assistance, their response to such incidents is 
critical. Future research should be done to uncover whether officer response time could 
have a potential effect on offender presence at the initial incident, offender arrest, victim 
injuries and medical attention given to the victim in other areas of the country. Perhaps a 
relationship could exist in more rural areas where officers take longer to arrive on scene, 
or in more urban areas where officers respond to more calls for assistance than the 
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